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INTRODUCTION: NEW APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES TO 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
Cyra Akila Choudhury* 
 
Regulation of and access to reproductive care has been an enduring 
concern of women’s rights activists, feminist lawyers and scholars, health 
care specialists, and the general public for the better part of the past five 
decades. Few social issues have had the distinction of being a source of 
lawmaking and interpretation with such regularity. Since the watershed 
decision of Roe v. Wade decriminalizing abortion, the activism surrounding 
abortion rights has been waged with such a ferocity on both sides that it has 
often overshadowed the other aspects of reproductive health and rights. 
Indeed, the very term “reproductive justice” signals a turn away from 
the traditional focus on rights and specifically to the reduction of 
reproductive rights to abortion to a more holistic approach. In the words of 
Professor Dorothy Roberts writing on intersectional issues of race, family, 
criminal law, and reproductive justice: 
A caucus of black feminists at a 1994 pro-choice 
conference coined the term “reproductive justice,” a 
framework that includes not only a woman’s right not to 
have children, but also the right to have children and to 
raise them with dignity in safe, healthy, and supportive 
environments. This framework repositioned reproductive 
rights in a political context of intersecting race, gender, and 
class oppressions. The caucus recognized that their 
activism had to be linked to social justice organizing in 
order to gain the power, resources, and structural change 
needed for addressing the well-being of all women.1 
Roberts goes on to argue that we need to “ditch the dominant 
reproductive rights logic and replace it with a broader vision of 
reproductive justice.”2 
Roberts reminds us of the mainstream pro-choice movements’ 
overreliance on narratives of trauma and their complicity in promoting 
abortion to limit unfit populations. Indeed, our histories have often been 
 
* Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank the editors of 
the FIU LAW REVIEW, Helen Sayers, and Rebecca Bovinet in particular for their diligent work on this 
symposium. 
1 Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights, DISSENT (Fall 2015), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights. 
2  Id. 
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dark with regard to the right to reproduce.3 It has not always been the case 
that what has been restricted has been the ability to terminate a pregnancy. 
My own concern as a comparative scholar has been in South Asia where the 
focus on family planning has led to the forced sterilization of poor women 
in the thousands. It has been about not just the use of sex selection in 
abortion that has resulted in nearly 60 million missing women from the 
population and a skewed gender ration—but also about the structures of 
families that make the right to abortion problematic as an individual right. 
And it has been about access to health care to reduce both maternal and 
infant mortality.4 
These experiences and histories are not alien among Native American, 
Latina Black, and poor communities in the United States. As such, 
reproductive justice resists and pushes back on the dominant framework of 
reproductive rights to include these experiences and histories. It challenges 
us to expand the frame. This symposium takes up that challenge by doing 
precisely what Professor Roberts suggests by conceiving of reproductive 
justice as broad set of challenges that require similarly broad strategies and 
critical thinking to resolve. This symposium examines the right to access 
abortion care,5 make decisions about family planning,6 the ability to obtain 
pregnancy care,7 the (mis)uses of science and expertise in reproduction8 and 
in litigation about reproductive rights, and the ways in which reproductive 
justice has been internationalized through transnational activism and human 
rights.9 The papers share a critical approach to these topics challenging us 
to think of how law is used to limit access to abortion and also used to limit 
the right to procreate. We are asked to think about whether fighting for 
reproductive justice through the law and in courts is the best use of 
resources given the limits to what can be achieved in terms of the 
distribution of healthcare through these strategies. Further, if the authors 
evince ambivalence about the law and its indeterminacy, they are equally so 
about science and the use of questionable scientific evidence in litigation in 
 
3  See e.g., Alfred L. Brophy & Elizabeth Troutman, The Eugenics Movement in North Carolina, 
94 N.C.L. REV. 1871 (2016). 
4  Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law Progress Through 
International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 259 (2011). 
5  Lisa M. Kelly, Abortion Travel and the Question of Choice, 12 FIU L. REV. 27 (2017). 
6  Stu Marvel, Laws of Conception: A Queer Genealogy of Canada’s Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, 12 FIU L. REV. 81 (2017).  
7  Khiara Bridges, Keynote Address at the FIU LAW REVIEW Symposium: New Approaches and 
Challenges to Reproductive Justice (Nov. 4, 2016), http://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreviewsymposia/ 
ReproductiveJustice/. 
8  Seema Mohapatra, Politically Correct Eugenics; Aziza Ahmed, Scientific Expertise in 
Abortion Jurisprudence, 12 FIU L. REV. 51 (2017).  
9  Rachel Rebouché, How Radical is Reproductive Justice? Remarks for the FIU LAW REVIEW 
Symposium, 12 FIU L. REV. 9 (2017).  
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achieving reproductive justice. All the papers share a central concern about 
how vulnerabilities, identities, and historic subordinations intersect to 
deprive some populations of reproductive justice. 
Rachel Rebouché’s article, How Radical is Reproductive Justice? 
Remarks for the FIU Law Review Symposium in the volume raises the 
question of what happens to reproductive justice’s priorities and its 
commitments to redistribution and justice when it becomes transnational 
and adopts international human rights strategies. Rebouché argues that 
reproductive justice, originating in women of color’s critique of rights 
based approaches in the United States loses much of its “radical potential 
by referring to human rights and social justice as always interchangeable.”10 
In other words, by relying on human rights in the transnational context, 
reproductive justice advocates may miss how the legocentrism (the focus on 
law reform, courts, and lawyers), postcolonial bias and the primacy of the 
global North, and redistribution on income and health resources of human 
rights strategies present challenges to realizing human rights’ promises of 
social and political transformation.11 
The intense focus on abortion both globally and within the United 
States has made it difficult to turn the attention of lawmakers and 
politicians to other areas of concern in reproductive justice. Since 1973, the 
polarization in the United States caused by abortion has led to a number of 
strategies aimed at eroding the right. For instance, there have been multiple 
attempts re-criminalizing abortion entirely and, for the most part, these have 
failed.12 More recently, we have seen an upsurge of fetal heartbeat bills that 
seek to protect a fetus as soon as its heartbeat can be discerned—as early as 
six weeks and before pregnancy may be known to the mother.13 Such 
measures to ostensibly overturn Roe v. Wade reflect only a small minority 
of Americans’ political preferences because there is broad support for legal 
abortion even if somewhat restricted.14 The important point to underscore 
here is that even if most Americans prefer that women avoid choosing 
abortion, they support the right to do so legally, particularly when other 
measures have not been available or the pregnancy involves trauma or 
 
10 Id. at 10. 
11 See id. 
12 See, e.g., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: State Trends at Midyear, 2016, 
GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/07/laws-affecting-reproductive-healt 
h-and-rights-state-trends-midyear-2016. 
13 Camila Domonoske, Ohio Legislature Moves To Ban Abortion As Early As 6 Weeks After 
Conceptionm, NPR (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/07/504663799/oh 
io-legislature-moves-to-ban-abortion-as-early-as-6-weeks-after-conception (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). 
14 Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) 
(Most Americans believe in the right to abortion but with some restrictions.). 
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danger such as a fetal anomaly, rape, or incest.15 
In spite of the widespread support for abortion rights, restricting the 
ability to obtain an abortion to earlier in a pregnancy has been undertaken 
not only through the laws seeking to criminalize mid and late-term 
abortions but also through restrictions on abortion providers. In The 
Burdens of Abortion Travel after Whole Woman’s Health, Lisa Kelly 
demonstrates how collateral attacks through laws that are now commonly 
called TRAP (“Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers”) have sought 
to impose strenuous restrictions on the abortion facilities in an attempt to 
put them out of “business”.16 The regulations are not directed at the 
constitutional right itself but impose onerous and unnecessary requirements 
on providers. These include requiring providers to have admitting privileges 
at nearby hospitals or facilities to conform to ambulatory care centers. Until 
the Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the most recent decision to 
interpret Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s undue burden standard, these laws 
have been successful in reducing the number of operating reproductive 
health care options.17 Whole Women’s Health has set back TRAP laws 
recognizing the instrumental use of law to erode access to abortion in some 
states.18 
Kelly analyzes the role of travel in abortion rights that has been the 
unfortunate corollary to the closure of health clinics particularly in rural 
areas. She argues abortion travel has been treated ambivalently by courts: 
Women’s ability to travel when abortion services are 
limited—“to chase their rights across state lines,” as Linda 
Greenhouse has recently described it—functions as a safety 
valve for states and for some women.  At the same time, 
through this act of exile, women and families are turned 
into “reproductive refugees,” . . . for whom travel effects a 
punitive logic of exclusion.  In contrast, for those women 
and girls unable to undertake abortion journeys, travel 
functions not as a punitive safety valve, but as a hard 
barrier leaving them with a constitutional right that cannot 
be realized in fact.19 
As others in this symposium have pointed out, the analysis of 
 
15  Id. 
16  Kelly, supra note 5. 
17  Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
18  Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Seigel, What a Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection 
for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L. J. FORUM (2016), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-difference-a-whole-woman-makes. 
19  Kelly, supra note 5, at 31. 
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economic inequality and its implications for women’s access to 
reproductive health care is at the heart of the reproductive justice agenda.20 
Without such an analysis, it is too easy to assume that a day or two of travel 
several hundreds of miles from home and staying overnight, several nights, 
or having to travel these distances repeatedly is not an “undue burden” for 
poor, working class, or unemployed women. Furthermore, woven into the 
narrative about abortion access is a strain of punitive justification that 
assumes that irresponsible and careless poor women, often of color, should 
bear the “responsibility” of their actions in getting pregnant.21 A 
reproductive justice approach requires the acknowledgement that not only 
wealthy or “career women” choose parenthood; poor women—both 
working and unemployed—can also choose to procreate and unintended 
pregnancy is not restricted to these women.22 It underscores the reality that 
since many abortion providers also provide critical health care quite apart 
from abortion, the reduction of the number of clinics like Planned 
Parenthood deprives poor women of access to reproductive health 
screenings and medical attention that they cannot afford to get anywhere 
else.23 Reproductive justice resists being reduced to simply abortion rights 
and access but also the right to procreate and have access to care that 
supports procreation.24 
Stu Marvel’s article Laws of Conception: A Queer Genealogy of 
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act takes up concerns about 
support for procreation at the intersection of LGBT rights, reproduction, 
and criminal law. Her paper which explores the legislative and regulatory 
landscape of assisted reproduction in Canada also demonstrates the 
troubling history of radical feminism’s collaboration with the state to 
criminalize assisted reproduction. The fear of its commodification and the 
exploitation of women’s reproductive capacities and radical feminists’ 
reliance on constructions of reproduction as “natural” and requiring state 
protection results in LGBT families having to travel abroad to form families 
or face severe criminal penalties for circumventing assisted reproduction 
regulations. Marvel shows “how the privileging of an idealized form of 
‘normal’ reproduction—predicated upon the two-parent, heterosexual, 
biological family . . . create[s] tangible effects in law, policy and the 
 
20 See Kelly, supra note 5; Bridges, supra note 7; Rebouché, supra note 9. 
21 See generally Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996). 
22  Id. 
23  See, e.g., Alexa Ura, Half of TX Women Face Barriers to Reproductive Health, 
TEX. TRIBUNE (May 12, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/12/more-half-women-face-
barriers-reproductive-service/; National Partnership for Women and Families Fact Sheet 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/repro/birth-control/defend-womens-access-to-
essential-health-care-fact-sheet-2012.pdf. 
24  See Roberts, supra note 1. 
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concrete outcomes experienced by those who fail to conform to such a 
model, most notably lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) 
parents.”25 
The scientific advances in reproduction have been welcomed by many 
but have also raised ethical questions. For instance, while LGBT and 
infertile heterosexual couples have embraced ART (“Assisted Reproductive 
Technology”) and surrogacy as Marvel notes in her article, there are groups 
that have been concerned about the social effects of these advances. One of 
these concerns that has been frequently raised is that of designer babies and 
also the effect of ART and particularly genetic therapies on our ideas about 
disability. In her paper Politically Correct Eugenics, Seema Mohapatra 
draws the connection between our history of eugenics and current uses of 
gene editing to create ideal children for those who can pay. “Using a 
reproductive and disability justice frame,” Mohapatra analyzes “how the 
acceptance of a politically correct eugenics—through the acceptance of 
these types of technologies—may affect and further disadvantage women of 
color and families of color.” Historically, eugenics has impacted the 
mentally disabled, poor, and/or communities of color disparately. The state 
has a dark history here that is often left out of our discussions on 
reproductive justice. Recent revelations tell us the extent to which the state 
forcibly sterilized women of color: Native American, black, and Latino 
women. Furthermore, mentally disabled women were routinely sterilized 
because as the Court opined in Buck v. Bell, “three generations of imbeciles 
were enough.”26 Mohapatra’s article reminds us that with the advances in 
science, neoliberal eugenics through very advanced technologies can take a 
sophisticated turn that has the appearance of respectable choice about one’s 
own family planning. 
Finally, Aziza Ahmed’s remarks transcribed for the symposium raise 
the question of how scientific expertise is used or (mis)used in abortion 
litigation. Ahmed argues that the longstanding use of the Daubert 
standard27 to assess the strength and validity of scientific expertise has been 
inconsistent in abortion litigation. In many cases, pseudo-science about the 
trauma of abortion or its dangers have been admitted alongside respected 
science as though it were of equal validity and merit. Ahmed examines the 
partial birth abortion cases like Gonzalez v. Carhart as examples of this 
loosening of “expertise.” In contrast, those cases where courts adhered to 
the Daubert standard, scientific evidence tended to support the striking 
down of abortion restrictions. Given the likelihood of increased abortion 
 
25 Marvel, supra note 6, at 86. 
            26     Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
01 - INTRODUCTION 5.9.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:02 PM 
2016] New Approaches and Challenges to Reproductive Justice 7 
challenges, Ahmed’s cautionary tale about the use of scientific expertise is 
an important one. 
In its broadest contours, reproductive justice includes access to 
reproductive healthcare like health screenings for cancer, contraception, 
disease prevention, fertility treatments and access to assisted reproduction, 
as well as the more traditional decisional and physical privacy regarding 
family planning. In addition, availability and access issues are interwoven 
with poverty, sexual orientation, and race. All too often, income determines 
what kind of health care one can receive and the ability to vindicate formal 
rights. To put it another way, poverty (often racialized poverty) stands in 
the way of substantive rights and justice. While legal scholars in the 
confines of the academy can live in the theoretical space of neutrality, 
feminists, critical legal theorists, critical race theorists, reproductive rights 
scholars and activists have argued and demonstrated that enactments like 
TRAP laws and attempts at criminalizing both ART and abortion have a 
disparate impact on communities of color and the poor. These symposium 
articles taken together raise questions and concerns about the regulation of 
reproduction, the access to care, the role of science and the role of expertise 
in the ongoing struggle for reproductive justice—a struggle will continue 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
